On freedom and responsibility

Philosophers and thinkers have long attempted to resolve the problem of freedom and responsibility, and it remains a central issue today. The fundamental question persists: do freedom and responsibility conflict with biological determinism?

First: The Definition of Freedom

Freedom can be defined as the individual’s capacity to act according to their will within society, under ethical constraints. (These ethical constraints were examined in a separate work) but they function here as the regulatory boundaries that preserve social order and collective well-being.

Second: The Definition of Responsibility

Responsibility consists of the duties individuals bear in order to protect shared collective interests within society. It is therefore not merely a moral abstraction, but a functional necessity for social stability.

Third: Is the Individual Free or Determined in Their Decisions?

From a neuroscientific and biological perspective, human beings are determined. Thoughts, intentions, and decisions arise from neurochemical processes in the brain. Neural activity underlies cognition, evaluation, and behavioral output. In this sense, every decision is the product of biological causation rather than metaphysical independence.

Fourth: If the Individual Is Determined, Why Punishment?

This question is essential. If human beings are biologically determined, why hold them accountable?

Although brain chemistry governs thought and behavior, certain brain regions are responsible for executive control, moral judgment, and behavioral regulation. When these systems are intact, the individual possesses the cognitive capacity to understand consequences and regulate actions. In such cases, responsibility is attributed.

Conversely, when neurological damage affects these regulatory systems, moral blame in the traditional sense becomes problematic, since the individual’s capacity for control is impaired.

Fifth: Should Social Deterrence Apply Even to Determined or Mentally Disordered Offenders?

Yes. Social deterrence remains necessary regardless of the origin of criminal behavior. If an individual poses a threat to collective interests or to the safety of others, society must protect itself.

Two principal responses follow:

Rehabilitation, if reintegration into society is possible.

Permanent incapacitation, if the individual remains a persistent danger.

However, it is crucial to distinguish between social deterrence for collective protection and metaphysical moral punishment. The former is justified as a social safeguard; the latter, understood as retribution based on absolute moral guilt, lacks justification within a deterministic framework.

Conclusion

Freedom and responsibility are not absolute metaphysical properties. They are concepts closely linked to neuroscience and biology. Human beings are relatively determined rather than metaphysically free. Specific neural systems underlie moral decision-making; when these systems are damaged, ethical judgment becomes compromised. Nevertheless, social deterrence remains justified as a protective mechanism to preserve shared societal interests.